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Council Directive 75/1171 interprets the principle of equal pay
embodied in Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome2 to mean that for work to
which equal value is attributed, men and women should receive equal
pay.3 The equal value principle, adopted by the European Economic
Community (EEC) in 1975, has been hailed by scholars and women's
rights advocates as progressive and exemplary.4 It is widely believed to
be the solution for eradicating wage discrimination and elevating the
status of women in the workplace. Yet in the European Union today, a
woman employed in the manual labor sector of the manufacturing industry
still earns, an average 25% less per hour than her male counterparts.
5
This statistic holds true in other industries as well. Although statistics
vary among the twelve Member States, the salaries of women range from
60 to 85% of that of men, and the gap widens proportionally with age.
" Juris Doctorate Candidate 1995, Stanford Law School. Associate Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, Los Angeles starting Fall 1995.
1 1975 J.O. (L. 45) 19 (legislation of the European Community).
2 Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. For a useful compilation
containing the Treaty of Rome and other European Treaties and Directives,
see generally EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS (Bermann,
Goebel, Davey & Fox eds., 1993).
3 See 1975 J. O.(L. 4) 19, art. 1.
4 See, e.g., Stephen A. Mazurak, Comparative Labor and Employment Law
and the American Labor Lawyer, 70 U. DET. L. REV. 531 (1993);
Christopher McCrudden, Comparable Worth: A Common Dilemma, 11 YALE
L INT'LL. 396 (1986).
5 EUROPE SOCIALE 3/91, at 30; see also David Grubb, Statistics of Annual
Earnings in OECD Countries, OECD LABOUR MARKET AND SOCIAL POLICY
OCCASIONALPAPERS (No. 4) (Paris 1990).
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Women's work is segregated, with the majority of women being
concentrated in a few, low-paying professions.6 Furthermore, a greater
percentage of women compared to men work in temporary or part-time
jobs which hold little or no promise for advancement.7 Finally, both short
and long term unemployment affect women by a much higher percentage
than men, 8 thereby perpetuating the cycle of women accepting low-paying,
dead-end jobs whenever the opportunity presents itself.
The situation of women has improved to a certain extent in some
Member countries in the past two decades. This improvement can be
attributed to a degree of sociological evolution: women are not only
generally more educated and have more professional training and
qualifications, but the decrease in the number of children they have, the
smaller age difference between their children, and the fact that
childrearing no longer necessarily keeps women away from their
professions for extended periods, have all contributed to a greater and
firmer presence on the job market.9 Yet incontestably, the gap between
men's and women's earnings still exists, and is even widening in some
Member States. Although the equal value laws that Europe have had on
its books since 1975 have perhaps succeeded in creating a dialogue about
the situation of women in the labor market, they have failed to eradicate
discrimination. In some instances, the fact that every Member State has
introduced the equal value principle in its national legislation has allowed
it to "rest on its laurels," so to speak. It is one thing to have good laws,
but it is quite another to apply them.
This paper argues that the concept of equal value is one which
implicates important economic, social and structural changes to which
West Europe has thus far had a questionable commitment. The steps
necessary to give equal value legislation its full worth require long term
strategizing, a tight coordination of social and economic policies between
Member States, and a great deal of legal and administrative efficiency.
6 EUROPE SOCIALE, supra note 5, at 25.
7 Id. at30, 31.
8 Id. at 26.
9 Francoise Cord, Women and the Restructuring of Employment, OECD
OBSERVER, February/March 1994, at 6.
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In view of the economic crisis faced by European nations today,10
it would be unrealistic to expect a great commitment to social and
economic restructuring. Nonetheless, in the wake of post-Maastricht
Europe, women represent an important resource in the European labor
market" and their needs cannot be ignored. Thus, while it is crucial to
work within a realistic economic framework, it is not advisable to wait for
better economic times to undertake some of the reforms necessary to
narrow the gap between men's and women's wages. Since in Europe, the
legal groundwork already exists to achieve this goal, it is now only a
question of extracting these laws from the theoretical world of scholarly
debate and putting them to the grind of practical utility for which they
were created in the first place.
The analysis begins with a definitional section aimed at clarifying
the concept of equal value and its mechanism. In Part III, the history of
the adoption and implementation of the Equal Value Directive is traced,
while in Part IV, the economic, social, administrative and legal problems
involved in applying the principle of equal value are analyzed. Finally,
Part V concludes by attempting to propose solutions which would
facilitate the future implementation of the equal value principle.
II. DEFINITIONS AND EXAMPLES
Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome requires that each Member
State "ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the principle
that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work., 12 The
Article further defines "pay" as "the ordinary basic or minimum wage or
salary and any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the
worker receives, directly or indirectly, in respect of his employment from
his employer." 13 Furthermore, "equal pay without discrimination based on
sex" means "(a) that pay for the same work at piece meal rates [should be]
calculated on the basis of the same unit of measurement" and "(b) that pay
10 Alan Friedman, Cure is Clear, but Europeans Dislike the Medicine, INT'L
HERALD TRIB. Mar. 11, 1994, at 1, 4.
11 EUROPE SOCIALE, supra note 5, at 23.
12 Treaty of Rome, supra note 2.
13 -
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for work at time rates shall be the same for the same job." 14 In other
words, Article 119 requires that a woman employed in the same capacity
as a man should receive the same pay as he does. The primary aim of the
equal pay principle is to eradicate straightforward wage discrimination in
mixed labor environments. In its widest sense, this principle can also be
an effective tool for eliminating indirect wage discrimination. It has,
however, no potential for addressing earnings differentials between men
and women employed in segregated professions.
Council Directive 75/117 expanded the meaning of Article 119 by
stating, in Article 1, that "[t]he principle of equal pay for men and women
outlined in Article 119 of the Treaty... means, for the same work or for
work to which equal value is attributed, the elimination of all
discrimination on grounds of sex with regard to all aspects and conditions
of remuneration." 15 Thus, equal remuneration must be applied not only
with respect to mixed functions in which either direct or indirect
discrimination can be found, but also to exclusively feminine professions.
Although it does not mandate a job classification system, Article 1 states
that if such a system "is used for determining pay, it must be based on the
same criteria for both men and women and so drawn up as to exclude any
discrimination on grounds of sex." 16 In subsequent articles, the Directive
offers no further definitions of the concepts embodied within it.
In the equal value principle, the value of work is of paramount
importance, thereby necessitating a revision of the qualifications of
workers, and a precise definition of their various functions. The most
widespread methods for evaluating work include rating, job classifications
and paired comparisons. In the "points method" of factor analysis, for
instance, the evaluator breaks down each job into factors, most commonly
including skill, responsibility, working conditions, and physical and
mental demands. Points or grades are then awarded for each significant
factor involved in a certain job, and the aggregate number of points
determines the comparative value of the job.
17
14 Id.
is Directive 75/1 17/EEC, supra note 1, art. 1 (emphasis added).
16 Id.
17 McCrudden, supra note 4.
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Widely dissimilar jobs have been compared using these methods.
Three English cases illustrate these comparisons. In one case,18 a female
cook's job was evaluated against the jobs of three male workers in the
same company - a painter, a thermal insulation engineer, and a joiner.
The analysis was performed on the basis of the following factors: physical
demands, work conditions, decision making, skills and knowledge, and
responsibility for tools, equipment and materials. As a result of this
comparison, the applicant's work was judged to be of equal value to that
of all three of her male comparators, and her wages were, therefore,
increased.
In another case,19 the jobs of female fish packers were compared
with those of a male manual laborer, leading to an increase in all the
women's salaries. Finally, in a more recent case,20 three women speech
therapists demanded an evaluation of their work against those of male
clinical psychologists and pharmacists employed by regional health
authorities in England and Wales.
Many definitional problems remain unresolved in the sphere of the
equal value principle. It is not only necessary to give clearer definitions to
concepts such as "value," "pay," "equality," and "discrimination," but it is
also crucial to define the economic and social parameters within which
these concepts will evolve. Community institutions and Member States
have thus far had a weak commitment to tackling the complex issues
surrounding equal value. It is perhaps for this reason that the European
Unnion has had, as demonstrated in the following section, questionable
success in its implementation of the concept ever since its inception.
III. THE ADOPTION AND EVOLUTION OF THE EQUAL VALUE
CONCEPT
A. The "Equal Work" Standard ofArticle 119
18 Hayward v. Cammell Laid Shipbuilders Ltd., 1984 INDUS. REL. L. REP. 463
[hereinafter Hayward v. Cammell]. The experts' report is published in part in
330 INDUS. REL. REV. & REP. 14 (1984).
19 Wells v. F. Smales & Son (Fish Merchants) Ltd., 2 EQ. Opp. REv. 24
(Indus. Tribunal 1985).
20 Regina v. Secretary of State for Social Services and others ex parte
Elizabeth Ann Clarke and others, 1988 C.M.L.R. 279.
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The EEC was created in 1957 as a customs union whose purpose
was to promote free trade and establish a free labor market among the
Member States. Initial Member States who already had pay equity laws
in their legislations feared that they would be at a competitive
disadvantage to potential future Member States without such laws.2 1 It
was, therefore, in an economic spirit of cooperation that they included
Article 119 in the Treaty of Rome, thereby making the equal pay principle
a Community legal requirement.
Article 119 required Members States to comply with its
provisions by the first stage of implementation of the Treaty - December
31, 1961. 22 It is important to note that at that time, Member States were
not yet inclined to adopt the provisions of the International Labor
Organization's (ILO) Convention No. 100, which spoke in terms of "equal
pay for work of equal value." They apprehended difficulties of
interpretation that this higher standard would create.
23
In May 1960, conscious of the fact that little effort was being
made to achieve the aim of equal pay for equal work, and anxious to
hasten the implementation of certain social policy goals, the Council of
Ministers of the EEC requested that the European Commission prepare a
detailed report on how best to achieve compliance with Article 119.24 The
Commission's report included a proposal that Member States implement
Article 119 by the end of June 1961, "by taking action to exclude any
discrimination based on sex so far as the remuneration of workers is
concerned." 25 This was, in effect, a reiteration of the goals already stated
in Article 119.
21 D. COLLINS, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: THE SOCIAL POLICY OF THE
FIRST PHASE 2 (1976).
22 Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, at art. 119, art. 8.
23 COLLINS, supra note 21, at 84.
24 EUR. ECON. COMM. COMM'N, THIRD GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcnVITIES
OF THE COMMUNITY 195 (1960). The Council of Ministers is a body of
representatives of Member State governments that has law making powers
conferred to it by Article 145 of the Treaty of Rome. The European
Commission is the policy-making body and secretariat of the Community.
25 Recommendations by the Commission to the Member States Relating to
Article 119 of the Treaty, BULL. EuR. ECON. COMM. Nos. 6 & 7, Aug./Sept.
1960, at 46.
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But implementation hit a standstill. In some Member States little
would be done to achieve compliance with the equal pay principle by the
first stage of implementation, and others declared their unwillingness to
move to a second stage in any other area of Community activity without
progress in all Member States to achieve equal pay. Agreements among
these nations concerning the principles embodied in Article 119 were
perceived as "form[ing] part of the 'package deal'."26 As was provided in
Article 8(3) of the Treaty of Rome, "[t]ransition from the first to the second
stage shall be conditional upon a finding that the objectives specifically
laid down in this Treaty for the first stage have in fact be attained in
substance and that... the obligations have been fulfilled."'27 Based on
these provisions, at the end of 1961, the governments agreed "that the
progressive implementation of the principle of equal remuneration for men
and women workers is intended to abolish all discrimination in the fixing
of wages. .."I' They further resolved "that any practices of systematic
downgrading of women workers shall be incompatible with the principle
of equal remuneration when . ..criteria in job evaluations for the
classification of workers are used which are not related to the objective
conditions in which the work is done."'29 They then devised a new
timetable for the elimination of wage discrimination by the end of 1964.
Despite this apparent goodwill, the Community again did not adhere to
their deadlines. However, the Commission and the individual Member
States chose to remain silent on the issue.
B. The "Equal Value" Standard of Directive 75/117
In the 1970's, the equal pay standard of the EEC began to develop
more rapidly. One impetus for this movement was that the Community did
26 3 H. SMITH & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY--A COMMENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY 119.04, at 3-762 (1985).
27 Treaty of Rome, supra note 2.
28 Equal Remuneration for Equal Work as Between Men and Women Workers,
BULL. EUR. ECON. C OMM. No. 11, Jan. 1962, at 8.
29 Id.
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not want to develop its image as solely an economic institution.30 This
consciousness gave rise to certain encouraging developments.
A 1972 report on the employment of women in the EEC indicated
that there was widespread sex discrimination in all Member States.3
Subsequently, in 1973, the European Commission indicated, for the first
time, its intention to use Article 169 of the Treaty 2 to initiate infringement
proceedings against Member States that had breached their obligation to
implement Article 119.3' However, little action was taken to substantiate
this threat.
After 1971, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was called to give
its interpretation on an increasing number of preliminary references by the
national courts. This indicates an increase in the number of cases arising
out of Article 119 in domestic courts. Initially, the ECJ was cautious in its
interpretation of Article 119. For instance, in the first of three cases
brought by Ms. Defrenne, a Belgian citizen, under Article 119,"4 the ECJ
ruled that differential pension rights did not contravene the provisions of
the Article. Despite this holding, the Advocate General implied that in
some circumstances, individuals could rely on Article 119 in national
courts.35 In subsequent cases, the ECJ became increasingly forceful in its
interpretation of the equal pay principle. By 1976, in the second and most
30 In response to this concern, several legal requirements were adopted as a part
of a progressive social policy, including sex discrimination. In addition to the
Equal Pay Directive, supra note 1, the EEC has two other Directives on sexual
equality: the Equal Treatment Directive, Council Directive 76/207/EEC, 1976
O.L (L 39) 19; and the Social Security Directive, Council Directive 79/7/EEC,
1979 O.L (L 6) 22. See SANDRA PRECHAL & NANCY BURRoWs, GENDER
DISCIMINATION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1990); and WOMEN,
EMPLOYMENT AND EUROPEAN EQUALITY LAW (Christopher McCrudden ed.
1987).
31 E. SULLEROT, THE EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN AND THE PROBLEMS IT RAISES
IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 47-50 (1972) (report
published by Commission of the Eur. Comm.)
32 Treaty of Rome, supra note 2.
s 1973 EUR. ECON. COMM. Doc. (No. 3000 final) pt. 248 (July 18, 1973). A
report on the new members of the European Community was given in 1974
EUR. ECON. COMM. Doc. (No. 742 final) (July 17, 1974.)
14 Defrenne v. Belgian State, 1971 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. (Preliminary Ruling).
11 Id. at 454-62.
[Vol. II
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famous Defrenne case,3" the ECJ held that Article 119 was in part directly
effective, thereby allowing a woman to claim her right to equal pay directly
in any national court. In the same decision, the ECJ also explained that
because Article 119 was now directly effective, the right to equal pay was
enforceable against both private and public employees. In practical terms,
this meant that private citizens could no longer invoke Article 119 as EEC
legislation directly in their courts, since its provisions now formed part of
national legislation.
Meanwhile, in January 1974, the Council adopted a Social Action
Program containing recommendations on how to achieve "equality between
men and women as regards access to employment and vocational training
and advancement and as regards working conditions, including pay .... 137
At the same time, in March 1974, the Economic and Social Committee of
the European Parliament finally approved an amended version of a
proposal for a Council Directive on the further development of Article
119's principle of equal pay made by the European Commission in
November 1973." This amended Commission proposal was presented to
the Council of Ministers in July 197421 On February 10, 1975, the Council
approved and adopted the version of the proposal amended by the
Economic and Social Committee as Directive no. 75/117.40
The aim of this Directive was to reinforce the equal pay standard
of Article 119. Although Article 119 spoke of "equal pay for equal work,"
the new standard echoed the provisions of the ILO Convention No. 100,
which had by then been ratified by all the Member States. 41 Thus,
36 Defrenne v. Sabena (BeIg. Airlines), 1976 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 455.
37 1974 0. J. (C1 3/1, 1 3/3) 17.
38 1973 0. J. ( Cl 14/46) 16 (communications and information) (proposal of the
European Commission); 1974 J.O. (C8 8/6) 8 (approval by the European
Parliament).
39 1974 EUR. ECON. COMM. Doc. (No. 1010 final) (July 1974).
40 See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1.
41 The ILO Convention No. 100 (Equal Remuneration Principle) was ratified by
the EEC Member States in this order: France (1953); Federal Republic of
Germany (1956); Italy (1956); Denmark (1960); Belgium (1962); Luxembourg
1995]
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the concept of "equal pay for work of equal value" was introduced as a
Community legal requirement in the form of a Directive.
Interestingly, the final definition contained in the Directive had
been included neither in the European Commission's initial 1973 proposal,
nor in the later amended proposals. Thus, it was the first time that Article
119 had been defined to encompass the notion of equal value. This was
due to several developments. First, during parliamentary debates, it had
been argued that pay for work of equal value should be equalized, and that
discrimination in job evaluation schemes should be eliminated.42 Indeed, a
resolution of the European Parliament states that "discrimination
continues in job evaluation with less importance attached to skill, speed
and concentration than to muscle power although more equitable methods
have been known for many years."
43
Another important factor influencing the decision of the Council
to adopt the equal value language had been the opinion of the Economic
and Social Committee on the same issue. The Committee's argument that
Article 119 should not be interpreted narrowly rested on two observations:
the passage of the initial resolution of December 30, 1961, 44 and the
ratification of the ILO Convention No. 100 by nine Member States.45 The
Committee further argued that the equal treatment requirement of Article
119 should be enlarged to include conditions of remuneration. It
recommended that equal pay should be defined as "equal treatment of men
and women, without discrimination on the grounds of sex, in respect of
(1967); the Netherlands (1971); the United Kingdom (1971); Ireland (1974).
ILO, INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCES, 60TH SESS., REPORT III, EQUAL
REMUNERATION (1975); ILO, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS:
OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING RATIFIED CONVENTIONS (1977, at 192-197);
(1980, at 138-47); (1981, at 149-50); (1982, at 152-56); (1984, at 188-202).
42 See 1974 O.J. (L. 17) 177, 177-78 (remarks of Mr. Van den Gun); see id.
at 180 (remarks of Lady Elles).
43 Resolution of European Parliament During Debates on Art. 119, id. at
point 2.
44 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
45 See supra note 41.
EQUAL VALUE
their conditions of remuneration, including assessment criteria. '"4 The
Commission also recommended that the term "equal work" be replaced by
"equivalent work," because this would "stop the practice of classifying
women who do equivalent work to men in 'low-wage groups'."
47
C. The Implementation of Directive 75/117
After the adoption of the equal value standard by the EEC, the
issue became one of enforcement of Directive 75/117. By the mid-1970s,
the commitment of the EEC to social policies was no longer shared by
Member States. Indeed, during that period, Europe was facing increasing
economic problems which contributed to a turnabout in economic and
political priorities. Governments could no longer assume that their
economies would grow. They planned, instead, for high levels of
long-term unemployment. Thus, Member States rejected the European
Commission's social proposals and resisted to incorporating the provisions
of the Equal Value Directive in their national legislations.48
Surprisingly, this resistance did not discourage the Commission,
which, by 1978, began to prepare for enforcement actions against
Member States that had failed to implement the Directive. This resolution
may have been sparked by the explicit criticisms of the Commission by
the ECJ and the European Parliament. Indeed, in Deferenne I, 49 the ECJ
noted that the absence of infringement actions against Member States by
the Commission was likely to reinforce the impression that Article 119
46 1974 J. 0. (L. C8 8/8) 17.
47Id.
48 In Ireland, for instance, a bill was introduced in the Parliament in
December 1975, whose purpose was to amend the Anti-Discrimination (Pay)
Act that was passed in 1974. 1974 AcTs OF THE OIREACHTAS 211 (Republic of
Ireland). The purpose of the bill was to postpone until Dec. 31, 1977, the
implementation of the equal pay provisions of the Act in the private sector
which was experiencing difficulties. The Irish government petitioned the
European Comnmission on February 5, 1976, to derogate from implementing
Directive 75/117 on the basis of Article 135 of the Treaty of Accession. The
Commission acknowledged the economic difficulties experienced by Ireland,
but did not, on the grounds of principle, comply with the request. The bill was
therefore withdrawn.
49 Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 455.
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was in fact a limited provision.50 Similarly, the European Parliament had
"deplore[d] the lack of urgency with which [the European Commission]
appear[ed] to be encouraging the Member States to respond to Article
119.
,51
Consequently, in January 1979, the Commission published a
report containing ways in which the principle of equal value should be
implemented and threatening to institute proceedings against Members
States which disregarded the Directive.52 In contrast to its inaction in
1973, after this threat, the Commission did initiate infringement
proceedings.
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom received formal notices of failure to
implement the Directive. Only Italy 3 and Ireland 4 satisfied the
requirements of the Directive. Actions against France and the Netherlands
were not pursued because these countries took immediate legislative
actions to correct their discriminatory laws. In May 1978, France
repealed discriminatory provisions which provided for accommodation
allowances limited to the "head of household,"55 and the Dutch legislation
50 Id. at481.
51 Burrows, The Promotion of Women's Rights by the European Economic
Community, 17 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 191, 198 (1980).
52 1978 EuR. COMMISSION DOC. (No. 711 final) para. 6.1.79, at 144.
53 See Act No. 903, Respecting Equality of Treatment as Between men and
Women in Questions of Employment, 343 GAZETTE UFFICIALE DELLA
REPUBLICA ITALIANA, [GA. uFF.] 9014 (1977) (Italy), reprinted in 2 ILO
LEGIS. SERIS, at It. 1 (1978).
54 Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act, 1974, supra note 48, amended by the
Employment Equality Act, 1977, AcTs OF THE OIREACHTAS (Republic of
Ireland), reprinted in ILO LEGIS. SERIES, at Ire. 1.
55 The French law has been largely amended since then. See Act No. 83-635
to Amend the Labour Code and the Penal Code as to Equality in Employment
Between Women and Men, 1983 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANqAISE [J. 0.1 2176, reprinted in 2 ILO LEGIS. SERIES, at Fr. 2 (1984).
This Act was supplemented by Circular of 2 May 1984 on the Application of
EQUAL VALUE
extended equal pay rights to the public service in July 1980.56 The case
against Belgium was withdrawn following legislative changes. Thus, the
Commission pursued infringement proceedings against Denmark,
Germany, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom.
1. Commission of the European Community v. Denmark.5 7 The
Commission alleged that Denmark had failed to incorporate the principle
of equal pay for work of equal value into its domestic legislation. The
Danish Act 32 of 4 February 1976 provided that:
Every person who employs men and women to work must pay
them the same salary for the same work [samme arbejde] under
this Act if he is not already required to do so pursuant to a
collective agreement.
58
The Danish government argued that in Danish, the term "samme arbejde"
meant both equal pay for same work, and for work of equal value. The
argument rested on the fact that the Act of 1976 was "only a subsidiary
guarantee of the principle of equal pay, in cases where observance of that
principle is not already ensured under collective agreements."59 Indeed, in
Denmark, most employment relationships are governed by collective
agreements which, it was maintained, uphold the principle of equal value.
This interpretation was based on "the 1971 agreement concluded by the
main organizations on the labor market, which provides expressly that
"equal pay means that the same salary is to be paid for work of the same
Law No. 83-635 of July 1983, reprinted in 131 EuR. INDus. REL. REP. 27
(1983).
56 See Act of 2 July 1980 (Equal Treatment of Men and Women in the Civil
Service Act), which supplements the primary Act to Lay Down Rules for the
Entitlement of Workers to a Wage that is Equal to the Wage Earned by
Workers of the Other Sex for Work of Equal Value, 129 STAATSBLAD VOOR
HET KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN [SB.] 1975 (Netherlands), reprinted in 2
ILO LEGIS. SERIEs, at Neth. 1 (1975).
57 Case 143/83, Commission of the Euopean Community v. Denmark, 1986
C. M. L. R. 44 [hereinafter Commission v. Denmark].
58 Id. (emphasis added).
59 Id. at 50.
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value regardless of sex."60  This practice is further confirmed by the
decision of 8 December 1977, of the Chairman of the National Industrial
Conciliation Board, who "applied the principle of equal pay to work 'of
the same value to and in production at the place of work'.,
6 1
The ECJ held a priori that Member States were free to implement
Directives by means appropriate to their domestic situations. Thus,
Denmark could leave the implementation of Directive 75/117 to collective
bargaining representatives. However, this method was not found to be, by
itself, sufficient to protect the rights of all workers. Indeed, it did not
cover the rights of workers who were not represented by unions, nor did it
protect the rights of workers in sectors not included in the agreements.
Moreover, it was not certain that all collective agreements contained the
principle of equal pay.
The Court therefore ruled that the State was obligated to lay down
the principle of equal pay "in unequivocal wording." This would allow
individuals to have a clear comprehension of the extent of their rights, and
direct courts to safeguard those rights in every instance. Thus, the ECJ
declared that the Danish legislation failed to fulfill its obligations under
Directive 75/117.
2. Commission of the European Community v. Germany. The
Commission argued that Germany had not fulfilled its obligation to
implement the Equal Value Directive fully with regard to employees in the
public sector. At issue were Article 3 of the German Constitution, which
states that "no one may be prejudiced or favored because of his sex,"
6 3
and section 612(3) of the Civil Code, which provides that "a contract of
employment may not provide, in the case of the same work or work of
equal value, for the payment to an employee of remuneration that is lower,
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Case 248/83, Commission of the European Community v. Germany, 1986
C.M.L.R 588 [hereinafter Commission v. Germany]. This case concerned the
implementation both of Directive 75/117 and of Directive 76/207 on Equal
Treatment. We are only concerned with the aspects of the case dealing with
equal pay.
63 Id. at 595.
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on grounds of sex, than that paid to an employee of the opposite sex...
,164
German constitutional provisions bind "the legislature, influence
the approach by the courts, and are directly binding on the public
authorities," 65 but they do not confer rights to private citizens which can
be asserted in German courts. For that reason, section 612(3) was
inserted into the Civil Code. However, it was argued by the Advocate
General that certain public sector employees - those recruited by a public
service contract - are not covered by Section 612(3). Thus, in so far as
public authorities are governed by constitutional rules and not the Civil
Code, such employees were not effectively guaranteed the right to equal
pay. In other words, the Commission maintained that "German law lacks
a rule of general validity which clearly imposes an obligation not to
discriminate between men and women with regard to remuneration." 
66
The ECJ, taking a practical stance, rejected the opinion of the
Advocate General. It found compelling the argument of the German
government that remuneration of public servants is based exclusively on
post and grade. According to the Court, the Commission had not
produced sufficient evidence of sex discrimination in the remuneration of
public servants. It, therefore, ruled that the objective of Directive 75/117
"had already been achieved in the Federal Republic of Germany at the
time when that Directive entered into force, with the result that no specific
measure was required for its implementation." 67 The case against
Germany was therefore dismissed.
It is surprising that in this case, the Court took such a weak
stance. Indeed, its ruling rests on the observation that the principle of
equal pay is protected so long as constitutional provisions are taken
together with correct administrative practices. If those administrative
practices are changed, however, the constitutional provisions by
themselves would not be sufficient to ensure pay equity. The Advocate
General correctly observed that the ECJ itself had ruled, in previous
decisions, that the implementation of Directives required "clarity and
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 601.
67 Id. at 617.
1995]
106 BUFFALO JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. H
certainty in legal situations"68 and that the measures adopted must be fully
effective. As regards to Article 6 of Directive 75/117, the Court had
previously stated that each state must provide a guarantee of the principle
of equal pay for work of equal value which "must cover all cases where
effective protection is not ensured."69 Yet, the German constitutional
provisions did not fulfill this obligation. Despite these arguments, the
Court chose to adhere to the observation that in practice, the German
system appeared to work. This leaves open the possibility of future cases
against Germany, if the Commission finds clear proof that administrative
procedures are insufficient to insure pay equity.
3. Commission of the European Community v. Luxembourg.
70
This case was brought as a result of Luxembourg's failure to eliminate
discrimination in the conditions for the grant of head of household
allowances to civil servants by February 12, 1976, the period prescribed
by Article 8(1) of Directive 75/117. At issue was the Law of 22 June
1963 regarding the remuneration of civil servants which stated:
1. A civil servant having the status of head of household shall be
granted a head of household allowance.
2. The following shall be regarded as heads of household:
(a) a male married civil servant and also a female married civil
servant whose husband is subject to an infirmity or serious illness
rendering him incapable of providing for the household expenses
or whose husband receives an income lower than the minimum
71wage.
68 Id. at 59 (quoting Case 102/79, Commission of the European Community
v. Belgium, 1980 E. C. P, 1473 [hereinafter Commission v. Belgium].
69 See Case 143/83, Commission v. Denmark, 1986 C.M.L.R. 44, 60.
[Advocate General Mancini's emphasis].
70 Case 58/81, Commission of the European Community v.
Luxembourg,1982 E.C.tR 2175.
71 Id. at 2177.
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As provided by Article 169 of the Treaty of Rome, the
Commission informed Luxembourg of its intention to initiate proceedings
by a letter dated April 3, 1979, and gave the government 60 days in which
to reply. In a letter dated June 6, 1979, Luxembourg acknowledged that
these provisions, as well as any similar provisions contained in collective
agreements, were discriminatory and assured the Commission that a draft
amendment was being prepared. The government further stated that in the
future, it would refuse to confer the force of law to collective agreements
which contained discriminatory provisions.
On May 8, 1980, noting that progress was slow on this matter,
the Commission issued a reasoned opinion pointing to the fact that
amending legislation had not yet been adopted. Luxembourg's reply that
progress had been made and that "both sides of industry had formally
undertaken to eliminate the discrimination... on renewal of [collective]
agreements"72 did not suffice, and the Commission filed an application to
the ECJ on March 16, 1981.
The Court rejected Luxembourg's arguments that it had faced
legislative difficulties in obtaining amendments to the discriminatory
provisions at issue. It was, therefore, declared that "the grand Duchy of
Luxembourg has failed to fulfill its obligations under the EEC Treaty."
73
It should be noted that as one of the six original members of the
Community, Luxembourg was to have secured the implementation of
Article 119 by January 1, 1962. 74 As was pointed out by the Advocate
General, this time limit was not affected by the adoption of the Directive.
The ECJ chose to ignore this fact and instead based its judgment on the
time limit laid down by the Directive. In either case, a basic tenet of the
Community is that States should abide by their Community obligations,
and do so in a timely manner. Luxembourg had clearly failed its
obligations in this respect. Thus, following this case, Luxembourg
amended the legislation in question to bring it in compliance with
Directive 75/117. 
75
72 Id. at 2178.
73 Id. at 2181.
74 See Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 455.
75
See Act of April 20, 1983.
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4. Commission of the European Community v. United
Kingdom.76 The case against England is more complex, in that it dealt
with the substance of the notion of equal value. A brief background on
the British Equal Pay legislation is helpful to understand the case. The
United Kingdom adopted its Equal Pay Act of 1970, 77 partly in
anticipation of future membership in the European Community. The 1970
Act, as supplemented by the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975, was a
compromise between what the UK perceived as two extremes: the "equal
work" standard of Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, and the "equal
value" standard of the ILO Convention No. 100. Britain thus chose to
adopt standards of "like work" and "work rated as equivalent." Whenever
a woman's work fell into either one of these two categories, equal pay had
to be accorded, unless the employer successfully proved that any variation
between a man's and a woman's pay in the contract of employment was
"genuinely due to a material difference other than the difference of sex.
78
In the Equal Pay Act, "like work" is defined as work that is "the
same" or of a "broadly similar nature," where the differences "are not of
practical importance in relation to terms and conditions of employment."
' 9
Furthermore, a woman's work is to be rated as "equivalent" to a man's
work if "her job and [his] job have been given an equal value, in terms of
the demand made on a worker under various headings (for instance effort,
skill, decision)," by a study undertaken to evaluate those demands.
80
However, job evaluations are not compulsory under the Act, and they
cannot be undertaken without the employer's consent. Thus, while these
provisions went beyond what was thought necessary for the purposes of
Article 119, they did not go so far as to mandate the equal value standard.
76 Case 61/81, Commission of the European Community v. United
Kingdom, 1982 E.C.R 2601 [hereinafter Commission v. UK].
77 Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41. See E. MEEHAN, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AT WORK
29-58 (1985) for a thorough discussion of the Act.
78 Id. § 1(3).
79 Id. § 1(4).
80 Id. § 1(5).
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The Commission argued that the Equal Pay Act failed to protect
the right of women employed in work that was not the same but of equal
value to those of their male counterparts, except in those instances where
job evaluation studies had been undertaken. Since these evaluations could
only be introduced upon consent of the employer, the rights of many
employees were left unprotected.
The United Kingdom advanced three arguments to defend its
legislation. First, it noted that during the debates of the Council of
Ministers preceding the adoption of Directive 75/117, the UK had asserted
its opinion that its legislation adhered to the principle of equal pay for
work of equal value. Indeed, it covered situations similar to those aimed
at by the Directive, and included provisions for situations in which pay
was fixed on the basis of job evaluation studies. Since the Commission
was fully aware of those discussions, it could not now object to the British
interpretation of the Directive. Second, the UK government maintained
that Article 119 and Directive 75/117 read as unit did not require job
evaluation studies, and there is no other way of comparing jobs. Finally,
it raised practical considerations, pointing in particular to the cost of job
evaluation schemes.
The Commission rejected the UK's arguments point-by-point. As
to the first, the fact that a country stated its interpretation of certain legal
provisions during debates preceding the adoption of a legal instrument did
not excuse it of its legal obligations with respect to that instrument after
its adoption. Second, the Commission argued that compulsory job
evaluation schemes were not the only method of introducing the equal
value principle into national legislation. It pointed out that other Member
States had adopted various methods of achieving the same end. And
lastly, the Commission noted that the advantages of the Directive clearly
would outweigh any practical difficulties encountered during its
implementation.
Upon request by the ECJ, the Commission presented the laws of
other Member States with regard to equal value, and explained other
methods besides compulsory job evaluations which could be used to
implement the principles of Directive 75/117:
In Belgium, France, Italy and Luxembourg, as also in the Federal
Republic of Germany, many problems are resolved by works
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inspectorates, and where a question fails to be resolved by the
courts, the latter are not necessarily bound by the results of job
evaluation schemes. In the Netherlands the question whether
work is of equal value is assessed on the basis of a reliable system
of job evaluation. Under the Irish legislation any dispute on the
subject of equal pay may be referred to one of the three Equality
Officers who, after investigating the matter, will issue a
recommendation. Since such recommendations are not legally
binding, it is ultimately for the Court to decide the matters
referred to them.8
Following this expos6 of methods adopted by other Member
States, the UK replied that "where Directives are concerned, Member
States are free to adapt their legislation by whatever means are most
appropriate to their own legal systems."82 In other words, methods that
have proven effective in other states would not necessarily work in the
UK. There is some strength to this argument. For example, the British
legal system is quite inflexible in that judicial policy-making and judicial
review are unknown concepts, since traditionally, judges were simply
expected to apply strict legal provisions to cases before them. Thus,
giving to courts the responsibility of adjudicating complex equal value
claims which require a great degree of subjectivity in their analysis and
interpretation would presuppose important reforms in the British judicial
system. The UK was not then, and is not now, ready to undertake such
reforms on the account of Community membership, especially in so far as
social policies are concerned.83
1 Commission v. U. K, 1982 E.C.R 2601, 2613. Interestingly, in the
Netherlands, value may be assessed on an equity basis if job classification
schemes are absent.
82 Id. at 2610.
83 During the political debates surrounding the British vote on the Maastricht
Treaty, Prime Minister John Major adamantly voiced his opposition to the
Social Chapter of the Treaty on European Union, maintaining that it "is a
socialist chapter, and [Britain] will have nothing of it." Prime Minister's
Questions of July 20, 1993, Live Television Broadcast on Bravo (July 20,
1993).
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As a counterpoint to the Commission's laudatory report of
methods adopted by other Member States, the UK responded, "in response
to the Commission's point that other Member States have reproduced the
objective of Directive facility, the United Kingdom refers to the extract
from the European Industrial Relations Review No. 90 of July 1981,
which speaks of the "modest impact" of the Netherlands law on equal
pay."184 In other words, the UK rejected the purported success of other
Member State's approaches, and maintained that it was preferable to
adapt Community rules to suit domestic situations rather than vice-versa,
unless the objective was to enforce the principle of equal value only
formally, albeit ineffectively. This argument would have been convincing
if the situation in Britain had been markedly better than that of other
Member States, but that certainly was not the case.
The ECJ rejected the arguments advanced by the UK. According
to the Court, these arguments were "a denial of the very existence of a
right to equal pay for work of equal value where no classification has been
made."J5 It was further explained:
It follows that where there is disagreement as to the application of
that concept a worker must be entitled to claim before an
appropriate authority that his work has the same value as other
work and, if that is found to be the case, to have his rights under
the Treaty and the Directive acknowledged by a binding decision.
Any method which excludes that option prevents the aims of the
Directive from being achieved....
The implementation of the Directive implies that the
assessment of the "equal value" to be "attributed" to particular
work, may be effected notwithstanding the employer's wishes, if
necessary in the context of adversary proceedings. The Members
states must endow an authority with the requisite jurisdiction to
decide whether work has the same value as other work, after
obtaining such information as may be required.
6
84 Commission v. UK, 1982 E.C.t. 2601, 2611.
85 Id. at 2615.
86 Id.
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In effect, the Court disregarded the UK's concerns about the
nature of its judicial system, and ruled that an authority, including a
judge, should have the power to make equal value assessments. It also
indicated that the assessment may be subject to judicial review.
Accordingly, the Court ruled that:
By failing to introduce into its national legal system in
implementation of the provisions of Council Directive
75/1 17/EEC of 10 February 1975 such measures as are necessary
to enable all employees who consider themselves wronged by
failure to apply the principle of equal pay for men and women for
work to which equal value is attributed and for which no system
of job classification exists to obtain recognition of such
equivalence, the United Kingdom has failed to fulfill its
obligations under the Treaty.
8 7
Following this ruling, the United Kingdom adopted an amendment
to the Equal Pay Act, the Equal Pay Regulation of 1983, which instituted
an extremely cumbersome procedure for bringing equal value claims.
However, the equal value provisions of the Act are only a residual
claim.88 According to the Equal Opportunities Commission of the UK,
"the operation of the Equal Pay Act as amended has become significantly
more complicated and protracted." 89 The procedures "are far from helpful
in practice in giving women an opportunity to make an equal value claim
and may well, in the long term, hamper attempts to rectify the acute
imbalances in pay which exist in the UK."'9
The outcome of this case illustrates perfectly how easily an
unwilling Member State can avoid its Community legal obligations by
adopting legislation and procedures which comply only in form, but not in
87 Id. at 2616-17.
88 See GENDER DISCRIMINATION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra
note 30, at 205-30.
89 Equal Opportunities Commission, Legislating for Change (Manchester,
EOC, 1986) 5.
90 GENDER DISCRIMINATION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note
30, at 94
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substance, with the objectives of a given Community Directive. Whether
purposefully, for lack of strong commitment, or because of genuine
difficulties encountered in the process of implementation, Member States
have not carried out the objectives of the Equal Value Directive -
eradicating wage discrimination. In the next section, we will analyze the
possible reasons for this failure.
IV. ISSUES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EQUAL VALUE
PRINCIPLE
The proper implementation of the equal value principle requires
an honest confrontation with complex economic, social, administrative,
and legal issues. The history of the adoption and the implementation of
the Equal Value Directive demonstrates a wavering commitment to social
issues on the part of both individual Member States and the European
Union as an entity. Unless these complex issues are tackled, the equal
value laws that each Member State has in its books, no matter how
"adequate" they are from a Community legislative standpoint, are only
pure futility.
A. Economic Issues
Unemployment is the greatest threat to the successful
implementation of the equal value principle. Between 1985 - the year
during which there was an increase in job creation in Europe - and 1989,
two-thirds of newly created jobs were occupied by women.9 1  The
participation of women in employment in the European Union increased
from 35% in 1975, to 41% in the present day.92 Thus, there is a direct
correlation between job creation and increase in women's employment.
This is a crucial factor because there exists a further relation between the
increased participation of women in the workforce and the reduction of
wage differentials. 93  According to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), several factors could explain this
91 EUROPE SOCIALE, supra note 5, at 24.
92 Id.
93 Equal pay for Work of Comparable Worth: The Experience of
Industrialized Countries, OECD LABOUR MARKET AND SOCIAL POLICY
OCCASIONALPAPERS (No. 6), at 53 (Paris 1991).
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relationship: the increased pressure exerted from women's lobbies on
governments; the economic advantages in improving labor market
flexibility and widening the skills base; the higher skills/status levels
associated with women's return to the workforce; a growing interest on the
part of unions to represent women by addressing their specific
employment concerns; and generally, an expansion in employment
opportunities.
94
It is important to note, however, that the increase in women's
workforce participation in Europe was primarily due to the growth of the
service sector, where almost 75% of women are employed.95  Between
1970 and 1992, seven million new jobs were created in the European
public sector, compared with only four million in the private sector.
96
This development is not particularly encouraging, given that the public
service sector, while it has provided needed jobs to women, is at the same
time the least secure from the standpoint of long-term employment. We
need only observe the current situation in Europe to prove this. In the
face of growing unemployment,97 European political leaders agree that
their continent's bloated public sector and its costly social safety net must
be dramatically cut.98 According to Padraig Flynn, Europe's employment
commissioner, in order to resolve the economic crisis, Europe must tackle
its "entitlement culture" through wage moderation and attrition.
99
For women, this means job losses and lower salaries. Indeed, in
1990, the percentage of unemployed women was almost double that of
94Id.
95 EUROPE SOC[ALE, supra note 5, at 25. Conversely, only 20% of women are
employed in the industrial sector, which demonstrates the enormous sectorial
segregation between men's and women's work. Id.
96 Friedman, supra note 10, at 4.
97 The unemployment figure for France is 3.3 million; this figure rises to 4
million for Germany. Id. at 1.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 4.
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men. 00 Equally important, women are more affected by long-term
unemployment than men. 10 These statistics hide another disturbing fact:
given that women are more touched by unemployment, they tend to accept
short term jobs more readily, thereby automatically reducing the time
period spent searching for profitable employment. This means that they
are often employed in professions which require lower qualification levels
than they possess. By affecting the quality of jobs held by women,
long-term unemployment is, therefore, also responsible for the women's
weak position in the labor market.
Given the economic crisis faced by Europe, political and
economic priorities have once again clearly shifted away from social
policies. 102  European leaders are attempting to cut back on social
spending and are putting the emphasis on labor market flexibility. In view
of the fact that women are losing jobs because of cuts in the public service
sectors, demands for wage increases, job training plans, and other
programs necessary for the improvement of women's position in the labor
market seem illusory. Quite contrarily, in times of high unemployment,
there seems to be an increase in discrimination against women. It has
been observed that both public employment agencies and employers
openly give preference to male unemployed applicants.10 3  In such
unfavorable circumstances, it is unrealistic to assume that courts or
legislators will be willing to increase the salaries of women who are
employed in jobs of equal value to those of men.
100 11.1% of women were unemployed as opposed to 6.5% of men. These
figures vary from country to country. In Spain, for instance, the
unemployment rate for women is four times that of Great Britain. In seven
countries - Spain, Ireland, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece and
France - this rate is above the Community average, which was 11.1% in 1990.
But in all Member States, unemployment affects a greater percentage of
women than men. EUROPE SOCIALE, supra note 5, at 26.
101 On average, 55% of unemployed women in the European Union are
long-term unemployed. This average increases to 69% in Spain 69.5% in
Italy, 70% in Greece, and 78.5% in Belgium. Id. at 28.
102 This is an instance of history repeating itself. See supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
103 Report on the Helsinki Conference on Women and Structural Change,
OECD GENERAL DISTRIBUTION PUBL. 198 (Paris 1993), at 3 [hereinafter
Helsinki Report].
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B. Social Issues
An inherent problem exists with the concept of equal value which
is largely ignored by its advocates: in attempting to evaluate the work
done by women against men's work, the equal value principle in effect
upholds an assimilationist standpoint. In other words, it holds the
message that if a woman behaves like a man in the labor market, she
deserves equal pay. This stance ignores the undeniable fact that few
women behave like men in the labor market.
A common argument among employers justifying the lower wages
paid to female workers is that they are less productive, less flexible, less
motivated, and absent more often than male workers. Because of their
reproductive function and their traditional role within the family and the
home, women often have to bear a double burden. It is true that in most
European countries today, women have fewer children,104 and do not
usually put their careers on hold for long periods on the account of
childrearing responsibilities. Nonetheless, this evolution has not changed
the role of women as primary caretakers of young children and the elderly.
On the contrary, the fact that the percentage of single, separated, or
divorced women has increased means that they have to bear their familial
and professional responsibilities alone.
To reconcile these important responsibilities, women often are
forced to accept part-time, temporary, or shift work. 10 5 Women who have
full-time jobs and who decide to work part-time for family reasons or for
lack of adequate day-care facilities have to change jobs, and even sectors
of employment. In general, jobs that allow these flexible arrangements are
limited to unskilled work categories, and offer a separate status below that
of full-time employment, especially as far as social security benefits are
concerned. Thus, although these alternative employment arrangements
104 Fertility rates range between 1.3 and 2.2 children per woman. OECD
OBSERVER, supra note 9, at 6.
105 In the European Union in 1991, the percentage of female participation in
part-time employment was as follows: Belgium, 89.3%; Denmark, 75.5%;
France, 84%; Germany, 89.6%; Greece, 62.9%; Ireland, 71.6%; Italy, 65.4%;
Luxembourg, 83.3%; the Netherlands, 70.1%; Portugal, 66.7%; Spain 78%;
United Kingdom, 86.1%. Id. at 10.
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make a contribution to women's employment, they, in fact, add another
dimension to gender-based employment segregation.
Another common assertion among employers is that women bring
lower qualification and skill levels to the job market. In many European
countries, women stay in school longer than do men. 06 But there is a
strong differentiation between them as far as the choice of subject matters
and career paths. Women are attracted to humanities and social sciences,
which are traditionally not considered highly marketable skills. Yet
increasingly, in post-industrial societies, the aptitudes acquired in the
educational system are given a higher value. Thus, abstract reasoning,
oral and written communication skills, and qualities traditionally referred
to as "female traits" such as organizational and interpersonal skills, are
likely to be in greater demand. It is not, therefore, so much a question of
lower skills or qualifications, but of different types of aptitudes, which in
the comparative world of equal value, are not yet "valued" as highly as
they otherwise should be.
High unemployment may be a secondary reason for the lower
skills brought by women'to the labor market in that a large percentage of
unemployed women are not registered in unemployment bureaus. 1"7 Yet
in all European countries except Germany, registration is a prerequisite to
access to courses and professional training programs organized for
unemployed persons.108
A third factor affecting the evaluation of women's work against
that of men is employment segregation. Women in Europe are
predominantly concentrated in a few, lower-paid sectors of employment.
Women's work seems to be systematically undervalued by employers,
which indicates discrimination. In these circumstances, comparing
women's work to men's cannot by itself yield satisfactory results. It is
more important is to uncover the reasons for the sharp occupational
segregation and the undervaluation of women's professions, and provide
remedies for these inequalities.
106 Id. at 7.
107 EUROPE SOCIALE, supra note 5, at 28-29. There are various reasons for
this: methods of job search, types of work sought, familial status (single
mothers), insurance or social security schemes during unemployment. Id.
108 In Spain and Greece, registration is not mandatory, although it does offer
a better chance of qualifying for training programs. Id.
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In sum, family responsibilities, differing educational choices,
lower participation in professional training programs, and employment
segregation, affect women's role in the labor market. These are social
issues that can only be dealt with by a strong commitment to social
reorganization: finding solutions to the problem of reconciling family
responsibilities and professional demands; acknowledging the differences
in the skills brought by women to the labor market and making proper use
of them; and correcting occupational segregation at its source, perhaps by
eradicating sex discrimination as a first important step. Without the
willingness to question the existing social and labor market structures, the
principle of equal value can only exacerbate the inequalities between men
and women. Indeed, it can only reinforce the misconception that women
should only be paid as much as men if they behave similarly in the labor
market.
C. Administrative Issues
Beyond the far-reaching economic and social problems related to
the principle of equal value, there are several concrete difficulties marking
its implementation: the definition of the concept of pay; the choice and
range of comparators; and the methodology of comparing work as far as
job evaluation schemes and the definition of what constitutes work of
equal value are concerned.
1. The Concept of Pay. The issue of pay has become an
increasingly complex one in modem employment relationships. Pay is no
longer defined simply as hard cash payments, but encompasses other
forms of contributions such as fringe benefits, paid holiday entitlements,
occupational insurance schemes, and even possibly contingent or potential
rights such as sick pay.109 The widening of the concept of pay has proven
useful to employers trying to attract labor in times of shortages or when
wage restraints are in place. But it has added a new dimension to the
concept of equal pay beyond wage structures and salary rates.
109 See Hayward v. Cammell Laird Shipbuilders Ltd., 1986 INDUS. REL. L.
REP. 287 (Employment App. Trib.).
EQUAL VALUE
Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome gives a broad definition of pay
as "the ordinary basic or minimum wage or salary or any other
consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the worker receives,
directly or indirectly, in respect of his employment from his employer."110
In Defrenne, the ECJ interpreted this to cover "all emoluments in cash or
kind or payable, on condition they are paid, even indirectly, by the
employer, as a result of the employment.""I Later, in Garland v. British
Railways Engineering 112 the Court went further to include benefits for
the family of the worker received after termination of the employment and
not granted pursuant to any contractual entitlement. This interpretation
gives a wide scope to the issue of fringe benefits attached to employment.
Despite the interpretation of the ECJ, there exists no commonly
accepted definition of "pay" among Members States, and the scope given
to the concept of remuneration varies. 113 The British case Hayward v.
Cammell Laird 114 illustrates the difficulties involved in assessing equal
value given the uncertain scope of the concept of pay. In that case, the
Court of Appeals confirmed the interpretation given by the Employment
Appeals Tribunal that equal value is achieved if the overall terms and
conditions of the woman's employment are not less favorable than those of
male comparators. The applicant had argued that the British Equal Pay
Act of 1970 allowed a woman to complain about any term which is less
favorable than a corresponding term in a man's contract.11 The tribunal
rejected this argument, fearing an increase in wage claims. It stated:
[F]ar from being as well off as they are, she could, in fact, be
better off. The corollary to that is not, of course, hard to see.
There would, if the matter is, in fact, properly viewed in that way,
and so dealt with, almost inevitably be a leap-frogging effect
leading to consequential claims from the other involved in the
situation.
116
110 Treaty of Rome, supra note 2.
III Case 80/70, Defrenne v. Belgian State, 1974 E.C.R. 445 , at para 6.
112 Case 12/81, Garland v. British Railways Engineering, 1982 EC.R 359.
113 McCrudden, supra note 4, at 19.
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This case may be referred to the ECJ for further determination. Indeed,
on the basis of ECJ jurisprudence so far, there is no evidence that the
obligation contained in Article 119 is satisfied if the overall employment
package is equal.
117
2. The Choice and Range of Comparators. One of the major
difficulties in reducing the male/female wage differentials is the
segregation of men and women into different sectors. Because of this
segregation, it is often very difficult for a woman to find a comparable
man doing work which could be judged of equal value. It is not strictly
necessary for a woman to choose a male comparator who is
contemporaneously employed, since references have been made to
predecessors and successors.118
The scope of Article 119 is not precisely defined. In
Defrenne," 9 the ECJ spoke in terms which could implicate a wide scope:
It is impossible not to recognize that the complete implementation
of the aim pursued by Article 119, by means of the elimination of
all discrimination, direct or indirect, between men and women
workers, not only as regards individual undertakings but also
entire branches of industry and even the economic system as a
whole, may in certain cases involve the elaboration of criteria
whose implementation necessitates the taking of appropriate
measures at Community or national level.1
20
Yet in Macarthys v. Smith,121 the potentially wide scope of Article 119
was limited by the rejection of the possibility of using a "hypothetical"
male comparator, since this would require comparative studies of entire
branches of industry, which would necessitate further implementing
117 See Garland v. British Railway Engineering, 1982 E.C.R. 445.
118 Case 129/79, Macarthys v. Smith, 1980 E.C.R. 1275.
119 Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E. COM. CT. J. REP. 455.
120 Id. at para. 18.
121 Macarthys v. Smith, 1980 E.C.R. 1275.
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procedures at Community and national levels. Instead, comparisons were
to be limited to "parallels which may be drawn on the basis of concrete
appraisals of the work actually performed by employees of different sex
within the same establishments or service." 
122
As for Directive 75/117, there is some indication that wider
comparisons may be necessary for its proper implementation. 123 Yet the
scope of comparisons under the Directive has not been judicially
determined. In the Commission v. United Kingdom, the ECJ ambiguously
stated that "a worker must be entitled to claim before an appropriate
authority that his work has the same value as other work." 124 Similarly,
in the infringement proceeding against Denmark, the issue was touched as
to the application of equal pay to the same work "at the same place of
work." 125 But the Commission failed to formally raise the issue, and the
ECJ did not consider it. There is, therefore, great uncertainty as to the
choice and range of comparators allowed under Article 119 and the Equal
Pay Directive, which must be clarified before the principle of equal value
can be properly implemented.
3. Methodology of Comparing Work.
(a) Job Evaluation Schemes: The ECJ's judgment in Commission
v. United Kingdom' 26 indicates that evaluation schemes are not
122 Id. at para. 15.
123 In Commission v. UK, 1982 E.C.R. 2601, the Commission endorsed the
system contained in the Netherlands Equal Wage Act of 1975, which states, in
section (2) that "where no work of equal or approximately equal value is done
by a worker of the other sex in the undertaking where the worker concerned is
employed, the basis shall be the wage that a worker of the other sex normally
receives, in an undertaking of as nearly as possible the same kind in the same
section [of industry]." This endorsement of the Dutch law was repeated in the
Commission's implementation review of the Directive. Report of the
Commission to the Council on the Application as at 12 Feb. 1978 on the
Principle of Equal Pay for Men and Women, COM (78) 711 final, Brussels (16
Jan. 1979) at 140. See also Commission v. Denmark, 1986 C.M.L.R. 47
(opinion of Advocate General Ver Loren Thermaat).
124 Commission v. UK, 1982 E.C.R. 2601, para. 13.
125 Commission v. Denmark, 1986 C.M.L.R. 44, 47.
126 Commission v. UK, 1982 E.C.R 2601; see supra note 76 and
accompanying text.
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compulsory under EC law. Thus, the methods by which comparisons
between male and female jobs are to be made are not clearly defined. In
Article 1 of Directive 75/117, it is stated that job evaluations must use
sex-neutral criteria. 127 Exactly what this provision entails is not clear.
However, it is certain that in the absence of vigilance, job evaluations
schemes could disguise and reinforce discrimination while giving the
appearance of objectivity. Bilka-Kaujhaus GmbH v. Von Hartz128 ruled
that in a discrimination claim, an employer must show that there is a
causal connection between any differences between employees and a
genuine objective pursued by the firm, and that these differences are
necessary to carry out the stated purpose. Thus, in the event that an
employee challenges the choice and weighing of factors in a job
evaluation scheme, the ruling in Bilka would apply.
In Rummier v. Dato-Druck GmbH, 129 the ECJ held that Directive
75/117 does not preclude, in job evaluations, the use of factors which
ftvor one sex, provided that the scheme does not discriminate overall on
the grounds of sex. There is the possibility of challenging an evaluation
scheme if the choice of factors is not representative of the tasks
undertaken by both sexes, or on the other hand, pays disproportionate
attention to gender-related attributes such as physical strength or manual
dexterity. This requires a careful balancing act, however, because in
order to avoid discrimination, a job evaluation scheme must use criteria
which can measure particular aptitudes on the part of workers of each sex.
It seems necessary, therefore, to have clearer directions on the part of the
Court of European Commission as to the exact methodology to be used to
compare jobs, and possible technics to ensure the 'sex-neutrality' of job
evaluation schemes.
(b) Work of Equal Value: Community Law offers little guidance
as to how equal pay for work of value should be assessed. In the case of
the Commission v. United Kingdom, the Court imposed the obligation
upon Member States to "endow an authority with the requisite jurisdiction
127 Directive 75/117/EEC, supra note 1, at art. 1.
128 Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Von Hartz, 1986 C.M.L.R 701.
129 Case 237/85, Rummler v. Dato-Druck GmbH, 1987 INDUS. REL. L. REP.
32.
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to decide whether work has the same value as other work, after obtaining
such information as may be required." 130 Thus, the emphasis was on the
procedural aspect of the claims of equal value. No indications were given,
however, on which factors should be weighed, measured and compared,
and in what manner.
The British cases which we spoke of above131 illustrate the lack
of uniformity in the approaches taken to compare jobs. In Hayward v.
Cammell laird Shipbuilders Ltd.,"' in which a female cook's job was
compared with that of a joiner, a painter, and a thermal insulation
engineer, the jobs under consideration were rated according to a number
of key demands placed upon those who performed them. A decision was
made about the value of several factors having a relationship to job
difficulty, and rated as "low," "moderate" or "high." The evaluator found
that the cook spent 80% of her time preparing meals, 15% cleaning or
serving, and another 5% on miscellaneous duties. The employer
challenged this method as being "so simple as to be crude and lacking in
precision." This opinion was not shared by the Industrial Tribunal who
stated that there was "nowhere to be found a requirement to adopt any
particular method of assessment."
In Wells v. Smales & Sons (Fish Merchants) Ltd., 33 the case in
which fourteen female fish packers claimed that their job was of equal
value to that of a male laborer paid six pounds more per week, a "broad
brush" approach was used. The expert divided the jobs of the workers
into a range of tasks performed and looked at the content of each
individual task. A series of calculations related to the time spent on each
task were undertaken, to arrive to a total score for each applicant and the
comparator. The result was that nine applicants had higher scores than
the comparator, while the scores of the other five applicants ranged from
79% to 95% of the comparator. The expert concluded that only those
applicants who scored higher were engaged in work of equal value to that
of the male comparator. Interestingly, the Industrial Tribunal found that
the scores of all the applicants were so close that they deserved equal pay
regardless of the differences.
130 Commission v. UK, 1982 E.C.R. 2601, para. 13.
131 See supra Part II, notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
132 Hayward v. Cammell Laid, 1984 Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 109.
133 Wells v. Smales & Sons, 2 EQ. OPP. REv. 24 (1985).
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These two cases demonstrate the lack guidance that courts have in
assessing claims of equal value. While a certain degree of flexibility is
necessary, a total lack of uniformity may ultimately prove to be
disadvantageous to the correct implementation of equal value claims.
Indeed, fixed patterns of wage determination do not allow for the
fluctuations inherent in a widely flexible system of value assessment.
Furthermore, the more open-ended the assessments are, the less likely it is
that indirect discrimination will be detected in those assessments. A series
of fixed requirements would therefore be favorable both to employers
attempting to set wages, and employees threatened by indirect
discrimination.
D. Legal Issues
1. Employers' Defenses and Burdens of Proof The most
important legal issue in the implementation of the equal pay principle is
that of the employers' defenses. 134 In fact, the issue of defenses can be
characterized as the other angle through which the whole concept of equal
value can be viewed. The justifications for inequalities between the sexes
which are legally acceptable, and the way the law assigns the burden of
proof, play a crucial role in elucidating which factors are perceived as
legitimate "objective" or "economic" reasons for these differences.
There are two principal issues in the employers' defenses
concerning pay differentials: the first treats the extent to which economic
or market forces defenses are admissible; the second concerns how
closely those defenses will be scrutinized for sex discrimination. An
important factor encompassing these two issues is the degree to which
courts and tribunals are familiar, if at all, with gender issues when
applying the employer's defenses to the cases before them.
The treatment of defenses by tribunals has differed from state to
state. In most Member States, the defense of paying a higher wage to a
man because that was the only way to make him accept the job has been
rejected. In the British case of Fletcher v. Clay Cross, 135 the Court of
Appeals stated that a successful defense should relate to personal factors
134 For a thorough analysis of the issue of employers' defenses, see
McCrudden, supra note 4.
135 Fletcher v. Clay Cross, 1979 IND. CAsEs REP. 1.
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such as length of service, age, skill or productivity, instead of extrinsic
market factors. This approach made it difficult for employers to rely on
market forces arguments. On the other hand, by advocating a strict
reliance on personal factors, the court barred the way to an inquiry into
economic, social and historical factors which perpetuate the differences
between men's and women's employment.
The analysis in Jenkins v. Kingstate136 and its application by the
Employment Appeals Tribunal were more rigorous. In that case, it was
held that it was not enough for the employer to show a lack of intention to
discriminate; it was further required that the pay policy be proven
reasonably necessary to achieve this objective (other than a sex-related
objective), and that the policy actually achieve that objective. In Bilka,'"
the ECJ devised a three-tiered test for national courts to follow:
[I]f the national court finds that the means chosen by Bilka meet a
genuine need of the enterprise, that they are suitable for obtaining
the objective pursued by the enterprise and are necessary for that
purpose, the fact that the measures in question affect a much
greater number of women than men is not sufficient to conclude
that they involve a breach of Article 119.138
The Jenkins and Bilka rulings were applied to a market forces
defense in Rainey v. Greater Glasgow Health Authority.139 In this case,
the House of Lords replaced the personal factors analysis applied in Clay
Cross with an "objectively justified" standard. This presumably allowed
employers to meet market forces problems (skill shortages, for instance)
by allowing them to pay higher wages to male employees, but did not
permit women's work to be undervalued because of market forces. The
test in Rainey is stringent in that it places the burden on the employers to
explain pay policies, and thereby allows greater scrutiny into possible
indirect discrimination. Yet it ignores many of the issues we have already
136 Case 96/80, Jenkins v. Kingstate (Clothing Productions) Ltd., 1981 E.C.R.
911.
137 Bilka-Kaufhaus GinbH v. Von Hartz, 1986 C.M.L.R. 701.
138 Id.
139 Rainey v. Greater Glasgow Health Authority, 1987 IND. REL. L. REP. 26
(House of Lords).
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spoken of, such as why women are predominantly concentrated in the
public sector, and whether they have the same opportunities in the private
sector. In sum, according to existing case law, a practice which
perpetuates blatant discrimination would be barred by courts, but more
subtle forms of indirect discrimination, in the areas of part-time work and
in segregated sectors for instance, would pass without strong scrutiny.
2. Sanctions and Remedies. A final issue that must be raised in
this analysis is that of the availability of adequate and appropriate
sanctions. The ECJ has correctly observed that it "is impossible to
establish real equality of opportunity without an appropriate system of
sanctions," and has ruled that Member States must take all appropriate
measures to ensure the fulfillment of their Treaty obligations. 4  This
means that a remedy must be effective and deter the employer from further
misconduct. Thus, compensation must be adequate in relation to the
damage sustained, and must consist of more than mere nominal
compensation. 141
One important problem that is raised by the issue of remedies
concerns collective agreements. The only effective means of supervising
discriminatory clauses in collective agreements (which are usually
determinative) 142 in order to eliminate discrimination from employment
contracts or relationships, may be through a collective enforcement
mechanism. Indeed, discriminatory terms in collective conventions can
have a "chilling effect" on individuals who hesitate to bring complaints
when the agreement applies to them. Moreover, tribunals may be more
deferent to the terms of a collective agreement than to individual rights.1
43
140 Case 14/83, Von Colson & Kamann v. Nordrhein-Westfalen 1984 E.C.P,.
1891, 1908.
141 Id. at 1909.
142 But note that in Ireland and the United Kingdom, collective agreements
are not legally binding.
143 For instance, collective agreements could be used as a material factor
defense in equal pay claims. See Christopher Docksey, The European
Community and the Promotion of Equality, inWOMEN, EMPLOYMENT AND
EUROPEAN EQUALITY LAW, supra note 30, at 12.
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The ECJ recognized these problems when it held that collective
agreements, even if they are not legally binding, may have "important de
facto consequences for the employment relationships to which they refer,
particularly in so far as they determine the rights of workers." 144 Thus,
any clauses in such agreements which contravene Community legal
requirements may be rendered inoperative, eliminated, or amended "by
appropriate means." 145 The question remains as to what constitutes
"appropriate means." Thus, once again, a crucial issue, that of
appropriate legal redress, has been left undefined in the scheme of equal
pay claims. Future cases will have to clarify this issue further if the equal
value principle is to have any objectivity in its application by Member
States courts.
V. CONCLUSION
Christopher McCrudden concluded his article on the equal value
principle by observing that "to do justice [to equal value], one should have
a thorough grounding in industrial relations and organization theory, labor
economics, psychology, statistics, feminist theory, and law, preferably
both labor and employment discrimination law."146 This conclusion goes
to the heart of the problems that Europe has had with the concept of equal
value. It is indeed not enough to state that equal value is a legal principle
in the European Union. The steps that must be taken in order to insure its
proper functioning involve complex economic, social, legal, structural
reevaluations.
It is true that the case law of the European Court of Justice and
the actions of the Commission at certain times have created a dialogue on
at least some of those complex issues. But the European Union has not
gone far enough to prove its commitment to the improvement of women's
situation in the labor market. The extremely disappointing wage and
unemployment statistics cited prove this.
Pretending to come up with workable "solutions" to the problem
of equal value in the context of this analysis would be unrealistic.
144 Commission v. UK, 1982 E.C.R. 2601, at 3447.
145 Id.
146 McCrudden, supra note 4, at 23.
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McCrudden's admonition about the expertise required to tackle the
concept of equal value certainly applies here. However, based on the
analysis of the problems faced by Europe in its implementation of the
Directive, we can point to a certain number of actions that must be taken
if equal value is to be more than a mere exercise in futility.
First, the range of occupational choices available to women must
be broadened. To end gender segregation in employment, an essential step
is to actively combat stereotypes. This can be done through curriculum
reforms that encourage both men and women to choose a wide variety of
subject matters and contemplate career paths other than the traditional
ones.1 47 Labor market measures, such as schemes designed to bring
women into traditionally male occupations may be another solution,
although affirmative action programs have understandably generated a hot
debate of their own. Another way to achieve the same objective would be
to facilitate the self-employment of women by encouraging them to set up
their own businesses. Finally, continuing education programs which are
geared towards women's specific needs and situations are indispensable,
so long as they emphasize rather than discourage the development of skills
and qualifications which are proper to women.
It is also necessary to upgrade women's occupations. This can be
achieved by encouraging men to enter typically female fields, identifying
and recognizing the skills and abilities required in "female" jobs, and,
whenever economically feasible, increasing the wages in those
professions. Of course, a prerequisite to the latter step is to establish
clear wage statistics highlighting gender differentials, and making
wage-setting systems as transparent as possible to exclude any indirect
discrimination. In this context, strict legal enforcement of
anti-discrimination laws is indispensable.
Finally and perhaps most importantly, it is necessary to make
professional and familial responsibilities more compatible. This should
not be viewed solely in terms of a female problem, because it is a problem
that affects men equally. Viewed simply in terms of a female demand, it
could become a pretext for discrimination against women, or lead to
increased employment segregation. It is important to encourage a sharing
147 In the UK and France for instance, the introduction of a core national
curriculum ensures that until the age of sixteen at least, students acquire
qualifications in the same subjects. Helsinki Report, supra note 103, at 6.
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of domestic and family responsibilities, in effect redefining the traditional
male and female roles. The importance of improving the availability and
quality of childcare services cannot be ignored in this context.
14S
Moreover, leave entitlements for both men and women, as well as
increased flexibility in the workplace are important elements in achieving
the goal of balancing professional and family commitments.
The crucial issue of whether undertaking such important changes
is possible or even desirable in times of economic crisis remains. It is
important to keep in mind that equality can only work if it is combined
with efficiency. Although some of the solutions given above concern
raising wages and improving social programs, which may be difficult to
undertake during periods of recession, many others involve changing
societal attitudes, confronting discrimination and questioning traditional
gender roles. As the history of the Equal Value Directive shows,
economically prosperous times do offer a more propitious stage for
undertaking social reforms. Yet translating equality solely to economic
feasibility is ignoring the depth and scope of the changes that must be
undertaken in order to make the equal value a reality.
148 In the Helsinki Conference on Women and Structural Change, it was
argued that two factors justify public provisions of childcare services: first,
society's direct responsibility for 'its' children; and second, the fact that social
services are an integral part of the infrastructure needed for the successful
operation and growth of the economy. Id. at 9.
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